Précis of Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 17-36

Précis of Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 17-36
Jessica Rugh
24 September 2008

Context
This section is the first introduction to Heidegger’s exposition of the problems of understanding existence. What does it mean to be? In this introduction he points out problems with the traditional understanding of Being and begins to posit what is needed in order to reconstruct and move forward with a correct understanding. Being and Time was originally meant to be two main parts, each divided into three divisions. He hastily completed the first two divisions of part one for publication. The work earned him a position at Freiburg University. At this point he seems to shift his focus (Kockelmans, in “Being-True…”) and does not seek to complete the remaining sections but develops other concepts in his later works.
John Sallis cites the origin of Heidegger’s thought as influences by Husserl’s phenomenology and Greek ontology. Being and Time is meant to be, according to Sallis, a “renewal” or “recapturing” of the question of Being that was neglected after the great Greek philosophers (p.94). Heidegger does not, however, seek to “reinstate” or “revive” the work of Plato and Aristotle but rather to reexamine the foundation for the understanding of Being.

The first page of this section includes a quote from Plato (in Greek) that simply states Heidegger’s problem with the traditional understanding of being. “We,…who used to think we understood [what you mean when you use the expression ‘being’], have now become perplexed” (p.19). He then states that his project is to “raise anew the question of the meaning of Being” which begins at a reawakening of an understanding of the magnitude of the question.


Introduction, Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being

I. The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being


1. The Necessity of an Explicit Retrieve of the Question of Being
This section begins the inquiry into the understanding of the question of Being. The problem with the understanding of Being, for Heidegger, is that the question has been forgotten—it has been neglected because everyone believes they already understand it. He claims that the “departure” from the question of Being began after the work of Plato and Aristotle and ceased to be “a theme for actual investigation” after it fueled their projects (p.21). The work of the Greeks has caused the definition of Being to be taken for granted.
Heidegger identifies three prejudices that are “constantly reimplanting and fostering the belief that an inquiry into Being is unnecessary” (p.22). These are: 1) that Being is the most universal concept; 2) that the concept of Being is indefinable; and 3) that Being is the one concept that is self-evident (p.22-23). These prejudices, however, are not acceptable excuses for neglecting the question of Being. He shows that although Being may be a universal concept it should not be exempt from further discussion and clarification, that the traditional manner of definition cannot be applied to being, and that self-evidence does not eliminate the fact that the meaning of being is “still veiled in darkness” and warrants further investigation (p.22-24).

2. The Formal Structure of the Question of Being
The second section elaborates the structure of the inquiry into the meaning of Being and targets Dasein as an entity that may serve as the primary example to be interrogated. He reiterates that the meaning of Being is already familiar to us but needs further clarification if we are to fully and concretely understand it. He says, “what we seek when we inquire into Being is not something entirely unfamiliar, even if at first we cannot grasp it at all” (p.25). However, the question of Being cannot be investigated in the same way as other concepts. He seeks to target an entity that can be used as an example for this unique method of inquiry. He selects “Dasein” to signify the being that is “transparent in its own Being” or understands that it is a Being being (p.27). Joseph Kockelmans (in A First Introduction…) simply explains Dasein to be “man’s being” because a human is the only being that can “question itself about its own being” (p.14).
Heidegger concludes this section by refuting the criticism that dealing with the question of Being in such a way is circular by claiming that “the issue is not one of grounding something…it is rather one of laying bare the grounds for it...” (p.28).

3. The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being
In this section Heidegger emphasizes the importance of laying bare the meaning of Being in terms of ontological research. Ontological research will remain “blind and perverted from its ownmost aim if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being” (p.31). Other sciences, including mathematics, physics, biology, the historiological humane sciences, and theology, have all experienced a reexamination that adjusted their foundations. Ontology should experience the same in its response to the question of Being.
An ontological examination of the meaning of Being, or, in other words, an examination of the essence or nature of Being must be thorough and extensive in order to lay a firm grounding for the understanding of Being. The ontological priority helps us begin to make progress beyond resuming the traditional means of understanding Being. It is not the only perspective that gives the question priority, however, as we will see in section 4.

4. The Ontical Priority of the Question of Being
This section is primarily devoted to a clarification of the essence and definition of Dasein. Dasein is essentially an entity which is “ontically distinguished” from other entities in that “Being is an issue for it” (p.32). Further, Dasein also “understands itself in terms of its existence” (p.33). Sometimes Dasein chooses its conditions of existence, other times the conditions happen to it.
He further clarifies the importance and essence of Dasein: “Dasein’s understanding of Being pertains with equal primoridality both to an understanding of something like a ‘world’, and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which become accessible within the world” (p.33). The exploration conducted in the last four sections has enabled Dasein to “reveal itself” as the entity that is most suited to be the object of inquiry in the question of Being. Dasein has now been targeted as a being that John Sallis describes as “we ourselves are” but that “is also the investigator (p.93). He further explains that this means that Dasein will “show itself to itself.”



Notes/Questions
How is what Heidegger is proposing to do with Dasein different from what Husserl attempted to do with the epochē?
What are the differences between existentiell and existential? Can they really be distinguished as much as Heidegger seems to think?



Works Cited
Kockelmans, Joseph. “Being-True as the Basic Determination of Being” in A Companion to Martin Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’. Ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans. USA: University Press of America, 1986.
Kockelmans, Joseph. Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to His Philosophy. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1965.
Sallis, John. “The Origins of Heidegger’s Thought” in A Companion to Martin Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’. Ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans. USA: University Press of America, 1986.